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Liberty and Marriage Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998
Lynne Marie Kohm*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When John Stuart Mill wrote his treatise on liberty, he had in mind a
sense of justice, fairness and equality.' Likewise, the founding fathers contemplated freedom, justice, and the inalienability of certain God-given
rights when they penned the Declaration of Independence. 2 When the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the concept of liberty in the
context of marriage, it determined that such liberty extends to the fundamental right to marriage, regardless of race. Loving v. Virginia determined

* Copyright © 1998 by Lynn Marie Kohm. Assistant Professor, Regent University School
of Law; B.A. 1980, Albany University; J.D. 1988, Syracuse University. This text was originally
delivered in November, 1997 at Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty
Years, at the Catholic University of America, co-sponsored by the Columbus School of Law, Howard
University School of Law, and the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at Brigham Young University.
Much gratitude and appreciation are expressed to David Coolidge for his foresight regarding the
need for this conference, Robert Destro for hosting it, and Duke Dorotheo for his long hours in
making it happen. I am thankful for the work of Shannon Woodruff and John Tuskey, staff attorneys
for the American Center for Law and Justice, who through their written work and oral briefings were
of great assistance in putting together this analysis. Likewise, it has been a pleasure to work with
Brigham Young University, Howard University and Catholic University as part of a symposium that
truly reflects the eternal family (Romans 10:12). Many thanks to the staff at THE BYU JOURNAL OF
PUBLIC LAW for their timeliness and professionalism in publishing this segment of the conference
presentations.
This article is dedicated to my family, with whom it is a privilege to serve on the same team.
Thanks to my husband, Joseph, for making it a joy to work together to build better children for our
future, rather than wait for a better future for our children. Bo and Kathleen, with all my love and
support, heaven is counting on you.
I. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, (reprinted 1975, from the original in
1859). The work of enlightenment philosophers formed the basis for the American concept of liberty.
Nonetheless, they have also been the basis for post modern American liberalism. See GERTRUDE
H!MMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN STUART MILL (1974) (discussing
Mill's balancing of liberty, freedom of action and individuality with fundamental principles of stable
social unions); GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LoOKING INTO THE ABYSS: UNTIMELY THOUGHTS ON
CULTURE AND SociETY 103 (1994) (suggesting that post modem liberalism of our culture is seduced
by the individual's independence as a matter of right lacking the necessity of social balance, which
Mill also promoted). See also JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 427 (World's Classics
ed. 1912) (1869) (stating Mill's claim that social relations between the sexes ought to be replaced
by a principle of perfect equality).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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that liberty necessitated the invalidation of state laws proscribing and punishing interracial marriage on due process grounds. 3
Richard Loving, a white man, and Mildred Jetter, a black woman, both
residents of Virginia, were married in the District of Columbia and returned to their home state to live. 4 They were charged and convicted by the
Commonwealth of Virginia of violating Virginia's miscegenation statutes
banning interracial marriage. 5 Their one-year jail sentences were suspended on the condition that they not return to Virginia for twenty five
years, and they promptly moved to Washington, D.C. 6 In the midst of the
civil rights movement of the 1960s they appealed these convictions, and
the United States Supreme Court heard their case. 7 Holding that liberty and
freedom to marry is indeed a fundamental right, the Court ruled that Virginia's statute was an unconstitutional denial of liberty. 8 The Court observed:
We have consistently denied the constitutionality of
measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race ....
These statutes . . . deprive the Lovings of liberty
without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. 9

The current question is whether that same liberty is extended to marriage regardless of the parties' genders. Thirty years after the Loving decision, the same legal arguments are being used to expand the fundamental
right to marriage to include same-sex couples. These arguments rest on
equal protection rationale, namely, discrimination based on gender. 10 This
article will review the due process argument offered in the context of
same-sex marriage.

3. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. !d. at 2.
5. /d.
6. /d. Mildred preferred the opportunity to live near her family, and wrote to President
Kennedy, asking for his assistance. The Justice Department took the case. Robert A. Pratt, The
Drama of Loving, Address at the Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty
Years, How. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1998).
7. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
8. !d. at 10-14.
9. !d. at 11-12.
10. See Richard Duncan, Loving, Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU
J. PUB. L. 239 (1998).
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Since liberty is inherent in any due process argument, the debate over
same-sex marriage has spawned the following questions: What is meant by
liberty in the context of state-sanctioned marriage today? What is meant by
a right to marriage as a substantive due process right today? Or how
broadly are courts to construe the substantive due process right to marriage?
These questions can only be answered with a thorough analysis of the
Supreme Court's treatment of liberty and marriage in Loving, recent scholarship, and judicial treatment of liberty and due process in a current constitutional context. Others have clearly examined and explained the concept
of marriage as a fundamental right. 11 We need to discuss what that means
in 1998, particularly in light of the cases that are pending in courts across
the nation. This article offers answers to these questions. It will also begin
the discussion of how we can expect the Supreme Court to treat this issue
in the future.
To fully understand this discussion, remember that there is no Family
Law in the national, unified sense. Family law springs from several
sources: the common law, state constitutional law and statutory law, federal administrative and regulatory law, and federal constitutional law. 12
The fifty states have their own sovereign rules on the subject, and individual state legislatures legislate many important family law relationships. 13
Marriage is an institution that is generally and routinely regulated by state
statute, because of the state's important nexus with the family unit and the
general welfare of its citizens. 14 As the United States Supreme Court has
stated:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life,
as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the
control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at
which the parties may contract to marry, the procedure or
form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obliga-

II. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Meaning of Loving: Liberty and Marriage, How. L. 1.
(forthcoming Spring 1998) [hereinafter The Meaning of Loving); and Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. I [hereinafter A
Critical Analysis].
12. JOHN DEWrrr GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER, SHERYL L. SCHEIBLE-WOLF, UNDERSTANDING
FAMILY LAw 1-3, 12-13 (1997) (adding to this list the role of the legal practitioner in shaping family
law).
13. /d. at 12.
14. /d. at 2. See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife ... belongs to the laws of the State, and not the laws
of the United States.").
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tions it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both ...
and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution. 15

As Loving indicates, however, since marriage is a fundamental right subject to constitutional protection, a state cannot prohibit the exercise of this
liberty in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 16
Section II will examine the procedural posture of pending due process
claims regarding marriage. Many of these cases are actually awaiting the
final decision of the Hawaii judiciary in Baehr v. Miike. 17 Section ill will
discuss the meaning and parameters of substantive due process at the end
of 1997 in the context of the most current United States Supreme Court
decision on the Due Process Clause. Section IV will address whether a
fundamental right to same-sex marriage exists. In that context the article
will discuss whether these standards require the recognition of a new fundamental right, or dictate that one already exists which is infringed upon
by state prohibition. Section V will outline what is necessary to support the
recognition of a new fundamental right and gives the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments and their analysis. Finally, section VI will conclude with a likely prospectus on the issue of liberty and due process in
same-sex marriage claims, should such a claim ever reach the United
States Supreme Court.
II. CURRENT STATE OF DUE PROCESS CLAIMS IN MARRIAGE
Under the Due Process Clause, people who are married or are interested in being joined in marriage have a constitutional liberty interest that
must be recognized when state proceedings are instituted against them. 18
This is what happened in Loving. It is another matter to discern whether
individuals interested in being joined in state sanctioned marriage have a
constitutional liberty interest that must be recognized when they seek state

15. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
16. Loving, 388 U.S. I.
17. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part by Baehr v.
Lewin, 875 P.2d 225, appeal after remand, Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), on remand
to Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
18. See also Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of
Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 20, 83 (1989).
Professor Tucker examines the constitutional due process implications for denial of hearing to
resident aliens and their unadmitted spouses, stating that citizens and permanent residents may have
the fundamental right to marry and associate with the mate of their choice without forfeiting
residence in the United States. /d.
The situation presented by same-sex marriage arguments is neither analogous, nor similar, due
to the fact that there is no state intervention in these relationships, but same sex couples are seeking
to achieve state intervention in the recognition of their relationships. This comparison leads to the
necessary discussion regarding what is needed to establish a new fundamental right. See Section V.
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intervention to establish that they are entitled to such a right. This is the
situation presented in Baehr. It is an altogether different matter when parties request state intervention, seeking to be afforded those rights, than the
situation in Loving, where the state interfered in these fundamental relationships. 19 This request for state intervention is not contemplated in due
process; rather, the clause protects an individual from state intervention.
Many same-sex marriage proponents confuse the two concepts and lump
them all under due process protection. 20 Due process does not require
states to sanction certain relationships, nor was substantive due process
meant to deprive states of their rights to enact statutes reflecting that state's
standard of conduct.
In cases pending, plaintiffs implore the state to establish this liberty on
their behalf, arguing they have a fundamental right to such liberty. The
central case of course is Baehr v. Miike. 21 When Ninia Baehr and Genora
Dancel were denied an application for a marriage license in Hawaii, they,
along with two other couples, brought their claim to court, suing on
grounds that requiring parties to a marriage to be of different sexes was
sex discrimination under the Hawaii State Constitution and was a denial of

19. In his article, Professor Robert Pratt explains that the Lovings were actually arrested in
their own bedroom one night when the Caroline County Sheriff and his deputies let themselves into
the Loving home to make the arrest for violation of the Virginia statute. (A more explicit example
of state intervention I cannot imagine.) Robert A. Pratt, The Drama of Loving: An Interracial Couple
Meets the Courts, How. L. J. (forthcoming Spring 1998).
20. See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States Choice of Law Regarding the Status and
Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 J. FAM. L. 551 (199394) [hereinafter Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?]. Henson uses Roe v.
Wade to demonstrate personal liberty and restrictions upon state action. /d. at 593 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)). Principles of substantive due process as protective of personal
privacy do require freedom from state interference in intimate relationships, as in Loving. Due
process protects one from governmental intrusion. Substantive due process, however, does not require
states to sanctify relationships. Furthermore, Henson takes issue with the Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), stating that deciding cases based on majoritarian morality is
specious at best. Henson, Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?, 32 J. FAM. L.
551, 595 (1993-94). On the contrary, Bowers is a mandate to limit the reach of substantive due
process in the protection of private conduct. Conduct inherent in homosexual relationships (and thus
in same-sex marriage) is not deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and the Bowers
holding clarifies that no constitutional right to homosexual sodomy exists. 478 U.S. at 194. To twist
substantive due process to afford protection to such conduct in a state sanctified marriage is to pull
due process rationale out from under its judicial legacy. Lynn Wardle further clarifies the importance
of the precedent in Bowers in his definitive article, A Critical Analysis, supra note II, at 34-44. In
the context of privacy and Bowers he states,
[t]he notion of a right to same-sex marriage ... is unsupported by the principle of a
zone of ... sexual privacy. If privacy protects consenting adult sexual behavior, such
behavior, under zone of privacy analysis, is also beyond the reach of government to
endorse. Thus, the zone of privacy doctrine does not justify legalization of same-sex
marriage.
/d. at 44 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203).
21. 1996 WL 694235. For the case history, see supra note 17 and David Orgon Coolidge,
Playing the Loving Card: Same-sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201.
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a fundamental right in violation of due process, equal protection and privacy.22 The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the couples could marry unless the State of Hawaii could show a compelling state interest in denying
the plaintiffs the right to marry. 23 Upon reconsideration and appeal, the
court appointed a commission to study the issue. 24
Storrs v. Holcomb 15 is a New York case involving two gay men who
applied for a marriage license in 1995. The court stated that there need be
only a rational relation between a similar classification and a legitimate
state purpose. 26 The rational relationship test is the lowest level of due process scrutiny and is applied in the absence of a fundamental right.
Callender v. Corbetf1 is a pending same-sex marriage case in Arizona,
where the same-sex plaintiffs have announced they would not appeal but
would await the outcome of the pending Baehr case. 28
Among the cases that have been decided previously are Dean v. District of Columbia, 19 Baker v. Nelson, 30 Jones v. Hallahan, 31 and Singer v.
Hara? 1 Contending that the denial of a marriage license violated their fun-

22. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
23. !d. at 60. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bums of the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, sitting in place of Chief Justice Lum who was recused, instructed the plaintiffs to prove
that homosexuality was biologically fated. /d. at 69-70. The dissenting opinion of Justices Heen and
Hayashi asserts that the Baehr majority sought to "manufacture a civil right which is unsupported
by any precedent." /d. at 74. For a thorough treatment of the inherent contradiction in the opinions,
see Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice": Marriage and the Realization that
Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293 (1996). See also Coolidge, supra note
21.
24. 875 P.2d 225. During this period of time, the Hawaii legislature passed HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 572-1 (1994), to be confurned by referendum of the people in November of 1998.
25. 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
26. /d. (relying on In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)).
27. No. 196666 (Ariz. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 13, 1994).
28. Same-Sex Couples Drop Lawsuit, May Rejile Marriage Case After Similar Hawaii Trial
is Resolved, ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 22, 1994, at B3. Additionally, a same-sex marriage case was filed
in Alaska Superior Court entitled Brauser v. Bureau of Affairs, as well as a case in Vermont titled
Baker v. Vermont, but these cases are as yet unreported.
29. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (holding (l) District of Columbia marriage statute prohibited
clerk from issuing marriage license to same sex couples; (2) clerk did not unlawfully discriminate
against plaintiffs under District of Columbia Human Rights Act by refusing to issue them marriage
license; and (3) same sex marriage was not fundamental right protected by Due Process Clause).
30. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that statute governing marriage does not authorize
marriage between persons of the same sex, such marriages are accordingly prohibited, and that such
statute does not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal for want of substantial
federal question).
31. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). The court summarily dismissed the appellants'
claims, as "[m]arriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that
purpose." ld. at 589. They added that the relationship proposed by these petitioners does not
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage. ld. at 590.
32. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage
did not violate constitutional provision that equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall
not be denied or abridged on account of sex). The conclusions in Singer were similar to those
reached in Jones.
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damental rights, the petitioners in Baker relied, as do petitioners in Baehr,
on Loving v. Virginia. 33 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments:

Loving does indicate that not all state restrictions upon the
right to marry are beyond reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in commonsense [sic) and in a constitutional sense,
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex. 34
The Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the Due Process Clause is not
a charter for restructuring marriage by judiciallegislation. 35 Because marriage is an institution based on the nation's deeply rooted history and tradition, an asserted contemporary concept of marriage could not expand the
reach of a fundamental rights interest. 36
A three-judge panel in Dean unanimously arrived at the conclusion
that the Due Process Clause does not protect a fundamental right for samesex marriage. 37 The Baehr ruling reviewed the due process and equal protection claims, finding that an abridgment of the right based on sex or sexual orientation could, in fact, be afforded heightened or strict scrutiny, at
least under Hawaii constitutional law. 38 The other forty-nine states have
not found any state or federal constitutional right to same-sex mar-

33. 388 U.S. I (1967).
34. 191 N.W.2d at 187.
35. /d. at 186.
36. /d. The court supported its conclusion by stating that marriage is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
37. 653 A.2d 307, 331 (D.C. 1995). Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., of Georgetown
University Law School, a prominent gay rights proponent, argued the case for the appellants, with
plaintiff Craig Dean as co-counsel on the brief. See D.C. Court of Appeals Rejects Gay Marriage
Appeal, LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES 13, 14 (Arthur Leonard ed.) (Feb. 1995).
38. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii State Constitution explicitly prohibits
discrimination based on "sex." HAW. CON ST. art. I. In the original ruling, Justices Heen and Hayashi
joined in a dissenting opinion that clearly stated why a prohibition on same-sex marriage did not
violate the Hawaii Constitution.
[These same-sex couples] complain that because they are not allowed to legalize their
relationships, they are denied a multitude of statutory benefits conferred upon spouses in
a legal marriage. . . . Those benefits can be conferred without rooting out the very
essence of a legal marriage. This Court should not manufacture a civil right which is
unsupported by any precedent, and whose legal incidents-the entitlement to those
statutory benefits-will reach beyond the right to enter into legal marriage and overturn
long standing public policy encompassing other areas of public concern. This decision will
have far-reaching and grave repercussions on the finances and policies of the governments
and industry of this state and all the other states in the country.
/d. at 74 (footnote omitted) (Heen, J., dissenting).
The Hawaii legislature has responded with a proposal to afford marriage-like benefits to same-sex
couples, but will retain the legislative power to limit the licensure of marriage to opposite sex
couples only. See generally Kohm, supra note 23.
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riage-Hawaii stands alone? 9 Because substantive due process claims invoke fundamental rights to privacy, marriage and intimate association,
same-sex marriage proponents routinely use due process arguments to
challenge the boundaries of marriage. The concept of due process has
evolved over the twentieth century, and it is of critical necessity to determine its meaning today.
ill.

WHAT IS DUE PROCESS IN

1998?

Over the two centuries of American government, due process has been
divided into two components: procedural and substantive. Procedural due
process refers to citizens rights to have notice and a hearing of his or her
grievances before government intervention or interference abridges the individual's firmly established rights. 40 Substantive due process rights refer to
more comprehensive and subjective perspectives of liberty and have
largely become based in privacy rights. 41
The essence of due process safeguards has always been to protect individual liberty against government action. 42 The concepts used in Loving
are being used today to argue that marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be denied based on gender, just as Loving pronounced that liberty in
marriage cannot be denied because of race.
The central problem in making the Loving analogy to same-sex marriage petitions is that race is afforded the strictest scrutiny for constitutional protection, while gender or sex is not and has never been afforded
the strictest scrutiny under the federal constitution. 43 Rather, gender is afforded a heightened level of scrutiny, an intermediate level of review between the rational basis test and the compelling state interest standard. 44
This standard provides that any restriction based on sex must be substan-

39. For a discussion of the uniqueness of the State of Hawaii as the situs for a same-sex
marriage action, see Coolidge, supra note 21.
40. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 682-83 (1988).
41. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). and Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1017 (demonstrating that Moore is
an especially dramatic indication of the rebirth of substantive due process doctrine as a preferred
method of analyzing privacy cases).
42. Professor Lynn D. Wardle of Brigham Young University has given an overview of due
process safeguards in the context of Loving. Wardle, The Meaning of Loving, supra note II.
43. Suspect classifications are generally those which discriminate on the basis of race,
alienage, or national otigin, and receive strict scrutiny. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473
u.s. 432, 440-41 (1985).
44. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (a landmark sex discrimination case
recognizing some sort of intermediate level of scrutiny for gender based classifications). See infra
notes 90 and 102.

253]

LIDERTY AND MARRIAGE

261

tially related to an important governmental objective. 45 This is important in
beginning to understand that Baehr is clearly not analogous to Loving. 46
To justify its decision, the Court in Loving added to the wealth of judicial support for the institution of marriage in the context of liberty that
holds this nation together. After citing to the landmark cases of Skinner v.
Oklahoma47 and Maynard v. Hil/, 48 the Loving Court emphatically stated:

To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a
basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes,
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of
law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual
and cannot be infringed by the State. 49
Liberty inherent in the choice to marry cannot be proscribed based on
race. Martin Luther King, Jr. articulated the standard of liberty set for
America by Jefferson and affirmed by Lincoln in the Emancipation Proclamation. 50 The standard for liberty was set long ago and was doc-

45. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
46. See also Wardle, A Critical Analysis, supra note II at 75-87, where Professor Wardle
discusses the fact that race and homosexual behavior are not equivalent legal categories in the section
entitled "Why the Loving Analogy Fails."
The underlying meaning of the term "sex" as used in Baehr is sexual preference. The
classification of sexual preference has never been afforded any heightened scrutiny whatsoever, but
merely calls for the rational basis test. This concept is explained further in Section IV.
47. 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942). Loving v. Virginia stated that "[m]arriage is one of basic civil
rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival." 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) (citing
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942)).
48. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
49. 388 U.S. at 12. These are the last comments the Court makes before ultimately ordering
that the convictions of the parties be reversed. /d.
50. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 14-15 (James M. Washington ed. 1986). More specifically, King stated:
I never intend to adjust myself to the tragic effects of the methods of physical violence
and to tragic militarism. I call upon you to be maladjusted to such things. I call upon you
to be as maladjusted as Amos who in the midst of the injustices of his day cried out in
words that echo across the generation, "Let judgment run down like waters and
righteousness like a mighty stream." As maladjusted as Abraham Lincoln who had the
vision to see that this nation could not exist half slave and half free. As maladjusted as
Jefferson, who in the midst of an age amazingly adjusted to slavery could cry out, "All
men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights
and that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." As maladjusted as
Jesus of Nazareth who dreamed a dream of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood
of man. God grant that we will be so maladjusted that we will be able to go out and
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umented in the early history of this nation, but the Civil Rights Movement
illustrated the fact that we as a nation were not living that standard. It was
not the standard that needed updating. It was man's need to conform to the
standard. 5 I
In the same vein, we need to review, now thirty years later, the standard of marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman. Should such
a model or pattern continue to be the standard? Or is that standard errant,
having evolved? Or are we simply having difficulty living up to that standard? A contemporary analysis of due process is welcomed to help determine whether the standard of liberty itself is evolving.
The most current Supreme Court case focusing its decision and rationale on due process is Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 which is supported by
a host of family law cases. 53 Glucksberg was the Compassion in Dying 54
case that was ultimately heard by the Court in January of 1997 with a companion case, Vacco v. Quill. 55 Glucksberg focused primarily on due process as it extends to a liberty interest in the right to die. The plaintiffs in
the original case were a non-profit organization called Compassion in Dying, Dr. Harold Glucksberg, three of his colleagues, and three terminally ill
patients (who died before the final outcome of the case). 56 They brought
the action against the State of Washington for a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the state's ban on assisted suicide as a violation of liberty and the Due Process Clause. 57
"The plaintiffs asserted the existence of a liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted sui-

change our world and our civilization. And then we will be able to move from the bleak
and desolate midnight of man's inhumanity to man to the bright and glittering daybreak
of freedom and justice.
/d.

51. Cal Thomas, Bill Clinton's Evolutionary Morals, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 13, 1997,
at B II (referring to the fact that Jefferson owned slaves and illustrating the fact that his actions do
not match the liberty standards he drafted for the new nation).
52. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
53. The opinion and citations in G/ucksberg appear to be a review of classic constitutional
family law cases, including Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967), Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 905 U.S. 438 (1972),
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See G/ucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267, 2271 n.19.
54. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). The en bane Court
of Appeals emphasized Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. Of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
55. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). Vacca dealt chiefly with the equal protection claims presented
by assisted suicide proponents.
56. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
57. /d. See also 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
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cide."58 After the district court agreed that the Washington statute did indeed violate the Due Process Clause, a panel for the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed. 59 Upon rehearing en bane, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the panel's decision, affirming the District Court. 60
The State of Washington appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, asking the Court to consider whether liberty includes the right to
suicide and, derivatively, assisted suicide. 61 The resulting opinion is the
most current constitutional description of the use and rationale of due process in the law today. In a very simple and quite traditional due process
analysis, the Supreme Court concluded in a unanimous decision that there
is no liberty interest in a right to die, reversing the decision of the en bane
Court of Appeals. 62 "[O]ur decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted
'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."63 This request to find a fundamental right in assisted suicide is strikingly similar to that presented by the
same-sex marriage proponents who are asking for state intervention to consider whether liberty includes the right to same-sex marriage. In what was
possibly the most closely watched case of 1997, the legal arguments in
Glucksberg focused on the Due Process Clause.
The Justices in Glucksberg used a two-pronged analysis to examine
the asserted liberty interest. 64 The respondents, Dr. Glucksberg, his colleagues, and Compassion in Dying, relied on Casey (which gave the Court
the opportunity to further clarify the parameters of that decision) and asserted that a personal choice to commit physician assisted suicide was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The
Supreme Court of the United States was not persuaded. The Court said:
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining
our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost
every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is
a crime to assist a suicide. The States' assisted suicide bans
are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions
of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation
of all human life. 66

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

117 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting Compassion
Compassion in Dying v. Washinglon, 49
Compassion in Dying v. Washinglon, 79
Washinglon v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
/d. at 2271, 2275.
Id. at 2271.
/d. at 2262-75.
/d.
/d. at 2262-63 (citations omitted).

in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459).
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995).
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
2261-62 (1997).
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The Court emphasized that condemnation of the inferred conduct (suicide or assisted suicide) is a "consistent and enduring theme[] of our philosophical, legal and cultural heritages. " 67 The Court explained its use of a
two pronged analysis early in the opinion.
First, the Court has regularly observed that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. 68 It gave for example, Moore v. East Cleveland, a case about family limitations on residence including extended family (a grandmother). 69 In that case the Court struck down a zoning ordinance which prohibited extended family from being part of the definition
of family in the term "single family dwelling." 70 The Court found such a
restriction to be a violation of substantive due process protections, 71 noting
the importance of a careful respect for the teachings of history. 72 Applying
this concept to Glucksberg, the Court restated the longstanding history of
condemnation (and criminalization) of suicide and assisting in suicide, declaring that such conduct is clearly not in line with deeply rooted history
and tradition. 73
Second, the Court required a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. 74 The Court gave as an example Reno v. Flores,
where the Court stated "the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe ... "fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.' ,7., The Court explained the need for this careful
description:
In our view, however, the development of this Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, described briefly above, has
been a process whereby the outlines of the liberty specially
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment-never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully clarified-have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples
involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our
legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective
elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial
reviews. In addition, by establishing a threshold require-

67. /d. at 2263.
68. /d. at 2268.
69. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
70. /d. at 506.
71. /d.
72. /d. at 503-504 (explaining that constitutional recognition extends to the tradition of
grandparents sharing a household with parents and children).
73. 117 S. Ct. at 2269.
74. !d. at 2268.
75. /d. (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (1993)).
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ment-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental
right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a
legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need
for complex balancing of competing interests in every case. 76
In language emphasizing that the Court was indeed looking for a clear description of the asserted right, it found there was no clear description of the
asserted liberty interest. 77

Turning to the claim at issue here, the Court of Appeals
stated that "(p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to be resolved
is whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time
and manner of one's death," or, in other words, "[i]s there a
right to die?," ... and "the liberty to shape death." As noted
above, we have a tradition of carefully formulating the interest
at stake in substantive-due-process cases. 78
The Court's tradition of careful formulation of the liberty interest was not
met. It found that there was no clear description of a constitutional right to
die. More particularly, the Court made a very clear distinction between
competent rejection of life support assistance and a right to commit suicide
with another's assistance. 79
Loving, by contrast, had no concern over the careful description of
interracial marriage because nothing about Loving was contrary to history,
nor did such an assertion require any new clear description of marriage. 80
There have been many attempts to make Loving apply to a range of marriage regulations, 81 but none of those endeavors have prevailed. The analysis of the due process claims presented in Baehr is clearer in the light
Glucksberg sheds on asserted liberty interests.
IV. THE ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented by Baehr are: (1) whether a fundamental right to
marry a person of the same-sex exists, or (2) whether a fundamental right
to state recognition and protection of same-sex unions that the partners

76. /d.
77. !d. at 2270.
78. /d. at 2268-69 (citations omitted).
79. /d. at 2270. The "clear description" that the Court requires carries a generalization that
the concept must be implicitly based in history.
80. 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967).
81. For example, the Loving analogy has been applied to state regulation prohibiting
polygamy, Potter v. Murray, 760 F.2d 1065 (lOth Cir. 1985), and before Baehr to the different sexes
requirement in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). See generally Wardle, A Critical
Analysis, supra note 11. See also Kohm, supra note 23, at 277-300.
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consider to be marriages exists when the federal constitution requires that
liberty cannot be infringed upon without the due process of law. 82
There is no express provision in the United States Constitution protecting same-sex marriage. Indeed, there is no constitutional provision protecting marriage in any form. Marriage is above and beyond the Bill of
Rights. 83 Moreover, legislatures can govern marriage without constitutional violations. 84 Same-sex marriage proponents rely on this fact, arguing
that state regulations limiting marriage to a legally sanctioned union between a man and a woman deprives them of that fundamental right. And as
has been discussed, constitutional case law has held that marriage is a fundamental right and a protected liberty interest. 85 Therefore, do laws that
refuse to recognize a fundamental right infringe on the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state may deprive any person of liberty without due
process of law? The Court stated in Glucksberg:
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the "liberty" it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests. In a long line of
cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the liberty specially protected
by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to
use contraception, Id. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);

82. Memorandum from John Tuskey, Senior Research Counsel, The American Center for Law
and Justice (ACU Memorandum) to Jay Sekulow, Chief Counsel, The American Center for Law and
Justice 10 (July 23, 1997) (on file with author). The ACU is a public interest law finn dedicated
to preserving religious freedom. The purpose of this memo was to brief the foUowing question: "Can
the proposed amendment to the Hawaii Constitution reserving to the legislature the power to limit
marriage to opposite sex couples survive a chaUenge under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the United States Constitution?" Jd. at 1.
83. Marriage, and the concept of the union of two individuals in a meaningful lifetime
relationship, was originaUy designed by a Supreme Being before codification of the law of marriage.
84. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 207-208 (1888). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (upholding state statutory requirements for residency in filing for divorce, and recognizing
a state interest in upholding its own requirements for marriage and divorce); Simms v. Simms, 175
U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife ... belongs
to the laws of the State, and not the laws of the United States.").
85. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (requiring less
burdensome state enforcement than prohibiting the marriage of a father who had not paid child
support).
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to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
and to abortion, Casey, supra. 86
With that background, the Court in Glucksberg rejected the asserted right,
applying the standard requiring a rational relation to a legitimate government purpose in the substantive due process analysis. 87 The Court stated:

We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due
Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.
But we ''ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and
open-ended." By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the
matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever
we are asked to break new ground in this field," lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transferred into
the policy preferences ofthe members of this Court. 88
In applying this approach of history and a careful description, the Court
concluded:

[W]e are confronted with a consistent and a most universal
tradition that has long rejected the asserted right and continues explicitly to reject it today .... To hold for respondents, we
would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice,
and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every
State. 89
The Court found no fundamental right to die. Therefore, the least
amount of scrutiny was applied to the claim in the absence of a fundamental right to die. 90 Once the Court concluded that the asserted liberty was not

86. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267. Note the extensive display and rich application of fatnily
law cases to what may not seem like a fatnily law case.
87. /d. at 2271.
88. /d. at 2267-68 (citations omitted).
89. /d. at 2269.
90. An intennediate level of constitutional scrutiny exists for gender based classifications. See
infra note 103. Furthennore, a federal court has previously ruled that sexual behavior is not a
category against which the United States as an employer cannot discriminate, as such behavior has
never been afforded a heightened standard of review. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990). Sexual behavior has yet to rise to the
heightened middle-tier scrutiny of gender, see Wardle, supra note 11, A Critical Analysis, at 83, and
"certainly will not rise to be afforded the strictest scrutiny now enjoyed only by the classifications
of race, alienage and national origin." Kohm, supra note 23, at 319.
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a fundamental right, government regulation of the asserted liberty interest
need only be rationally related to legitimate government interests. 91
Baehr asserts a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Because
same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in history and tradition and requires a new description, a new fundamental right must be recognized.
The applicant couples in Baehr have admitted that they were asking the
court to recognize a new fundamental right. 92
What lurks behind the analysis are those subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due process judicial review. 93 The Court in
Glucksberg implied that some personal decisions may be identified and
explicitly recognized by the Court as deeply rooted in this nation's history
and tradition, and which may therefore lead to recognition of new fundamental rights, citing Roe v. Wade and Casey. 94 Further explaining this position, the Court clarified its previous language in Casey, which effectively
back-peddled from a strict scrutiny application to the abortion right, to an
undue burden standard of review to any regulation on the right to abortion.95 The use of Casey allowed the Court to state that previously discerned fundamental rights found in autonomy "do[] not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions
are so protected."96 This may appear to give the Court latitude to swing
either way on Baehr. In determining what the petitioners in Baehr must
demonstrate to support the recognition of a new fundamental right, how-

91. 117 S. Ct. 2258, 227I (1997).
92. 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. I993).
93. 117 S. Ct. at 2268.
94. /d. at 2270 (citing Roe, 4IO U.S. I I3 (1973) (finding a fundamental right to abortion)
and Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (allowing state regulated limitations on that fundamental right)).
95. I I 7 S. Ct. at 2271. The Glucksberg opinion reads:
Similarly, respondents emphasize the statement in Casey that:
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."
Citing Casey at 851. Brief for Respondents 12. By choosing this language, the Court's
opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those
personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our
history and tradition, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty,
that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion moved from the
recognition that liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience and belief about
ultimate consideration to the observation that "though the abortion decision may originate
within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise." Casey,
505 U.S. at 852, I 12 S. Ct. at 2807 (emphasis added). That many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
decisions are so protected, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4I I U.S.
I, 33-35, 93 S. Ct. I278, I296-I298, 36 L.Ed.2d I6 (1973), and Casey did not suggest
otherwise.
96. /d.
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ever, very little of this subjective element remains. 97 Baehr asks for judicial discernment and recognition of that new fundamental right.
V. WHAT IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE RECOGNITION OF A
NEW FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?

This analysis will be referred to as the implicit/explicit approach. The
implicit element refers to the requirement that the right be deeply rooted in
history and tradition. The explicit element refers to the necessity of a clear
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Using this implicit/explicit approach laid out in Glucksberg, it is clear that Baehr would
not have the solid constitutional foundation that Loving enjoys under this
approach.
The arguments for a fundamental right to inter-racial marriage begin
with the implicit prong that a right to marry is fundamental, and protection
of this right is deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. The explicit prong lies in the fact that race is expressly afforded the strictest scrutiny, and has been carefully articulated by statute and case law in the past.
These premises lead to the natural conclusion that marriage cannot be prohibited based on race. This is Loving in a nutshell.
The arguments for a fundamental right to same-sex marriage would
begin with the implicit assumption that the right to marry is fundamental,
based in privacy, liberty and autonomy (Casey, Roe, and Loving would be
cited), and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. The explicit
prong would need to do one of three things: either (a) show there is a careful description of the asserted liberty (i.e. same-sex marriage would be recognized as a careful description rather than an anathema), (b) articulate a
careful description of marriage as not based on the parties different sexes,
or (c) show that sex or gender is an expressly forbidden discrimination and
must be afforded the strictest scrutiny. 98 Thus, if any one of these three
explicit alternatives can be met, there is no need for a new fundamental
right. These are the strengths of the argument, and they are not compelling.

97. It should be noted that an exception to the rule based on the "subjective elements'' would
be required for drawing an analogy between Loving and Baehr, and thus between race and gender.
Because the concept of marriage is defined by the requirement that parties be of different sexes,
marriage would need to be defined as a fundamental right, regardless of sexual preference, which
would then also be a landmark in gender law as well. This is unlikely in light of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990}, and even Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). See generally
Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf Supreme Court Storytelling, The Culture War,
and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1997).
98. This is the most pragmatic argument in the Hawaii litigation, based on Hawaii's explicit
delineation that discrimination based on sex is constitutionally forbidden, and thus afforded the
strictest scrutiny by the Court of that State.
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The weaknesses of the argument ultimately disable the reasoning and
rationale for same-sex marriage. First, under the implicit prong, same-sex
marriage was not contemplated in history and tradition and is not a relationship deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. This gravely
weakens the fundamental right premise. The right to marry currently does
not encompass same-sex marriage, and the concept of marriage carries an
implicit assumption that marriage can only occur between a man and a
woman 99 Thus, a same-sex union would be rendered a non-marriage. 100
Secondly, under the explicit prong, sex (or gender) 101 is not afforded
the strictest scrutiny under federal constitutional law, but rather some middle level of heightened scrutiny at best. 102 If sexual orientation, instead of
gender, is the gauge, a more fatal result is likely because sexual orientation
has yet to rise to the middle tier of scrutiny that gender enjoys. 103 Then comes the hurdle of carefully describing the asserted right. There would need
to be some description of the right to not be discriminated against based on
gender, sex, sexual orientation or sexual preference in choosing a marriage
partner. This would have to be combined with a description of this new
concept of marriage.

99. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (concluding that
"all [definitions] recognize that [marriage] is a union or contract between a man and a woman.").
When any marriage is missing a basic requirement, e.g. of suitable age, unrelated by blood, one at
a time, of different sexes, it is termed a "non-marriage."
100. !d. A sex change operation that took place after the marriage did not change the fact that
parties of the same sex cannot complete a marital union by nature, and such is determined at the
time of the marriage agreement, not after. /d.
lO I. Because the Hawaii State Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, the
petitioners in Baehr use sex interchangeably with gender and use both terms as substitutes for
sexual behavior, to persuade the court that each category is protected in Hawaii by the word "sex"
in the Hawaii Constitution. Therefore, any "sex discrimination argument only survives if sexual
behavior is interpreted to mean sex." Kohm, supra note 23, at 319. "Gender" cannot equal
homosexual behavior. See also Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the
Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6
WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 147, 155-164 (1998).
102. I refer to the "middle-level scrutiny" standard from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
where the court settled on an "intermediate" level of scrutiny for gender based classifications. The
opinion does not explicitly announce the application of a new standard different from the "strict
scrutiny" test, which is reserved for fundamental rights and suspect classes, or from the traditional
"mere rationality" test.
103. /d. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), confums this, stating also that fundamental
rights are only those deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. (Bowers also cites Moore
v. East Cleveland extensively.) The Bowers majority clearly stated their reluctance to recognize new
rights as well:
The Court is most vulnerable and it comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments],
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundarnental.
478 U.S. at 197.
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Asking the government to recognize a right neither contemplated in
our nation's history or tradition, nor clearly described (as something other
than a state sanctioned domestic partnership) leaves the argument in ruin,
thus requiring more creativity than the Court can supply. With both the
implicit and explicit prongs unsatisfied, states would be required to apply
the traditional "mere rationality" test to any restrictions placed on marriage. That is indeed what happened to the right to die argument in
Glucksberg. The same result may befall the right to same-sex marriage
argument in Baehr, should the case ever reach the Supreme Court.
Some might suggest that Justice Souter's concurrence in the right-todie cases could function as an opening for same-sex marriage rights in the
future. In his concurring opinion to Glucksberg, Justice Souter seemed to
suggest that he would embrace a substantive due process analysis that examines whether the state statute in question sets up an arbitrary imposition
or purposeless restraint. 104 Relying chiefly on Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, 105 Souter distinguished his con-currence from the Court's
plurality opinion which clearly desired to block potential exploitation of
the Due Process Clause. 106 It is over this very point that the Court emphasized the development of this Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence as that which has at least been carefully refined by examples
deeply rooted in the nation's history and legal tradition. 107 As the Court
attempted to rein in the subjective elements, 108 Justice Souter wanted to
supply modem justification for substantive due process review from
Harlan's dissent in Poe. 109
The opinion of the Court noted that they did rely on Justice Harlan's
dissent from Poe in the Casey decision. 110 Specifically, the opinion stated,
"but, as Flores demonstrates, we did not in so doing jettison our estab-

104. 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
105. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). In Poe, a physician and two married couples challenged
Connecticut's anti-contraception laws. The Court ruled that the case was not one that presented a
"clear threat of prosecution," and therefore refused to hear the case on appeal. Justice Harlan
dissented, contending that the Connecticut statute violated the due process interest in marital privacy.
/d. Harlan later wrote a simple concurrence in the Griswold case (being somewhat vindicated by the
Court's ruling in favor of marital privacy) where he developed the "ordered liberty approach." 381
u.s. 479, 496 (1965).
106. 117 S. Ct. at 2262 (referring to "longstanding expressions"), 2268 (referring to "our
established method"), 2271 (referring to the fact that this due process assertion does not warrant a
"sweeping conclusion"), 2277 (referring to a strong "resistance").
107. /d. at 2268.
108. /d.
109. /d. at 2277. See also id. at 2268 n.l7 (where the Justices remind Justice Souter that Poe
was not even cited in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)). Nor was it cited in Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990), the most heavily cited authority in the
Glucksberg opinion, where the court determined in Cruzan that rights "so rooted in history, tradition,
and practice ... require special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment." Cruzan, at 278-279.
110. 117 S. Ct. at 2268 n.17 (citing 505 U.S. at 848-850).
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lished approach. Indeed, to read such a radical move into the Court's opinion in Casey would seem to fly in the face of that opinion's emphasis on
stare decisis." 111 Recognizing the potential for abuse of the subjective elements using Casey and Poe, the Court distinguished its opinion in
Glucksberg.
With a lengthy concurrence embodying a heavy emphasis on the facts
presented by the respondent in Glucksberg, Justice Souter laid out a case
for confining the hastening of death to a physician-assisted occurrence
only that would indeed be under the imposition of reasonable regulation by
the state. 112 Strengthening this position with the concept that due process
has historically protected unremunerated rights, 113 Souter emphasized that
In my judgment, the importance of the individual interest
here, as within that class of "certain interests" demanding
careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim cannot be gainsaid. Whether that interest might in some circumstances, or at
some time, be seen as "fundamental" to the degree entitled to
prevail is not, however, a conclusion that I need draw here, for
I am satisfied that the State's interests described in the following section are sufficiently serious to defeat the present claim
that its law is arbitrary or purposeless. 114

The Court's unanimous opinion, however, supports the notion that if
Souter favors same-sex marriage rights in a future case, he will be alone in
his use of a due process argument to buttress such a claim because of the
Court's clearly stated resistance to the expansion of fundamental liberty
interests. 115 The holdings of the right-to-die cases present a due process
argument against same-sex marriage.
Further analysis of the arguments can be done in light of Shahar v.
Bowers 116and Turner v. Safley. 117 Some constitutional law theorists may

Ill. /d. (citing 505 U.S. at 854-869).
112. /d. at 2286-88. Souter uses an analogy to Roe, 410 U.S. 113. "Like the decision to
commit suicide, the decision to abort potential life can be made irresponsibly and under the influence
of others, and yet the Court has held in the abortion cases that physicians are fit assistants." 117 S.
Ct. at 2288.
113. /d. at 2288.
114. /d. at 2290 (citations omitted). Justice Souter's concurrence in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct.
2293, 2302, likewise acquiesces to the lack of arbitrariness of the opinion under the due process
standard.
Souter often used phrases in both the Vacco and the Glucksberg concurrences such as "at this
time," Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302, and "might in some circumstances, or at some time," Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. at 2290. Such phrases generally give cause for future hope on the part of the losing
parties. Regardless, Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg might suggest that any argument in favor
of same-sex marriage would have a stronger base in Casey. Otherwise, Glucksberg has little to
nothing to offer claims to marriage by same-sex parties, even in Souter's estimation.
115. 117 S. Ct. at 2268, 2271.
116. 70 F.3d 1218 (lith Cir. 1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), and reh' g en
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argue that Shahar' s panel decision evidences some support for the liberty
argument sketched above, based in recognition of the right to intimate association. 118 Shahar involved the withdrawal of an employment offer by
the State Attorney General's office upon it learning of plaintiff's plan to
participate in a marriage-like ceremony with her lesbian lover, Greenfield. 119 The argument articulates a constitutional protection for same-sex
marriages. "Where intimacy and personal identity are so closely intertwined ... between Shahar and Greenfield, the core values of the intimate
association right are at stake." 120 Another well reasoned argument sounds
like this:
Despite the panel's decision in Shahar, it is unlikely for
two reasons that courts will decide that a fundamental right to
same-sex marriage exists. First, all the Supreme Court's cases
involving the fundamental right to marry have involved marriages between men and women. Second, the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Glucksberg signals a retreat from Casey's
broad language concerning liberty and the limits of government action. Glucksberg emphasized the importance of examining our nation's history and tradition in determining
fundamental rights. Glucksberg also emphasized that the
Court would view asserted rights claims specifically rather
than as part of some general right to privacy or autonomy. The
asserted right to marry a person of the same sex has no basis
in this nation's history and tradition. Moreover, even if the
Due Process Clause prevents states from prohibiting homosexuals from forming marriage-like unions, the clause does not
require states to recognize those unions by giving them legal
recognition and benefits. 121

Turner v. Safle/ 22 demonstrated that other attributes of marriage
deemed important by the Supreme Court outweigh any interest a state
would have in promoting procreation by prohibiting same-gender unions.
With a litany of critical characteristics that remain in marriage, aside from
the physical and biological aspects of that relationship, the Court declared
that a state could not withhold from an inmate the right to marry. 123 On the
other hand, the Court has also historically tied the fundamental right to

bane, 114 F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 1997).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

482 U.S. 78 (1987).
114 F.3d 1097.
70 F.3d at 1220.
/d. at 1229.
ACU Memorandum, supra note 82, at 15 (citations omitted).
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
/d.
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marriage to the activities associated with procreating and raising children.124 It remains a fact that only reproductive cells from heterosexual
couples can accomplish procreation.
By tying the right to marriage to the right to procreate, the
Court's right to marry cases underscore the context in which
they arise-in cases involving the union of men and women.
Nothing in those cases suggests that the Court was contemplating any right to same-sex marriage. To draw support for
same-sex marriage from those cases would be to rip those
cases from their factual context. 125
The Glucksberg opinion demonstrated that the Supreme Court will
require litigants to show that the alleged right they assert, which will have
to be described with specificity, is deeply rooted in our nation's legal history and tradition. Glucksberg indicated that the Supreme Court has an
outright and formidable reluctance to find a new fundamental right absent
firm grounding in history and tradition, and a clear description of an asserted liberty interest.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS

In American law there is no liberty interest in same-sex marriage.
There is no violation of due process in regulating marriage as the union of
a man and a woman. There is no fundamental right to marry another individual of the same gender. The fundamental right to marry has always contemplated unions between men and women. Other relationship formation
has not been legally recognized as marriage, but in fact has been termed a
non-marriage. 126 A potential Supreme Court opinion in Baehr might read
something like this:
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining
our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost
every State-indeed, in almost every westem democracy-marriage implicitly is defined by and limited to a union
between a man and a woman. The States' marriage regula-

124. Professor Wardle reviews these and other cases in his article, The Meaning of Loving,
supra note 11. See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which encompasses the right "to marry, establish a home,
and bring up children."); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (recognizing
fanilly life and procreation as liberties protected by due process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (recognizing the right of married people to use contraceptives based in a liberty interest);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (protecting the fundamental freedom to procreate from
state infringement).
125. ACU Memorandum, supra note 82, at 18.
126. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
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tions are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and
preservation ofthe institution of marriage. Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing some sort of
criminal penalty on such requisite (homosexual) sexual conduct. (See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) The
primary and most reliable indication of a national consensus is
. . . the pattern of enacted laws.) Indeed, opposition to and
denunciation of homosexuality-the physical basis for same
sex marriage-are consistent and enduring themes of our
philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. 127

The importance of the implicit prong cannot be underestimated.
Glucksberg illustrated the Supreme Court's reluctance to find new fundamental rights absent the firm grounding in history and tradition. Same-sex
marriage proponents have made attempts to overcome apparent history and
tradition with massaged history. 128 Likewise, the importance of the explicit
prong cannot be underestimated. There needs to be a careful articulation
and description of the asserted liberty interest. The problem with a clear
description of assisted suicide was in the necessity that the liberty specially
protected by the Clause includes a right to commit suicide which, itself,
includes a right to assistance in doing so. The problem with a clear description of same-sex marriage is that the right itself requires a right to
sodomy and homosexual sexual activity within the carefully crafted description of the asserted liberty. As with assistance in suicide, these are not
constitutionally protected privacy rights. 129
The last hope for Baehr and same-sex marriage proponents in the
quest for due process and liberty in same-sex marriage is the power of subjective elements and judicial discretion that the Supreme Court used in
Roe and in Casey and distinguished in Glucksberg. This would only be
possible with some new existential or ontological view of marriage found
by the Justices. Loving and Glucksberg have clearly given the standard for
liberty and demonstrate the influence and power of clear legal views that
the Justices hold. Baehr and same-sex marriage proponents envision societal and cultural approbation of homosexuality. They would like to accomplish this with the use of liberty and the Due Process Clause. But even a
move from prohibition to tolerance of committed homosexual relationships
does not, however, amount to an endorsement. Such approbation will be
difficult, if not impossible, to gain.

127. This is an adaptation of Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262-63 (1997). Casey, Loving,
Moore, Bowers and Glucksberg citations would be included.
128. See Kohm, supra note 23, at 323-324.
129. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See also Duncan, supra note 101, at !54
(emphasizing that Bowers is the law, and inferior courts are required to follow it).

276

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 12

Still today the brilliant truth and purity of Loving are undeniable and
incorruptible. Liberty manifested itself, and due process protected Richard
and Mildred Loving from further state interference in their marital union.
Thirty years later, the historical case of Loving v. Virginia stands alone in
its articulation of the primacy of marriage, and its wisdom and insight into
racial concerns. Now in 1998, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be tortured to demand state intervention in recognizing
and sanctioning a new marriage relationship between Ninia Baehr and
Genora Dancel. Liberty manifests itself to protect against redefinition of
the marital union. Baehr will not have the legacy that Loving enjoys, as
liberty and due process assertions are beyond Baehr and the rights asserted
in same-sex marriage claims.

